hashpwn

Terms of Service & Privacy Policy Effective Date: Aug 31, 2025 Welcome to hashpwn.net (“we,” “our,” or “us”). By accessing or using hashpwn.net or any of its subdomains (collectively, the “Services”), you agree to comply with and be bound by these Terms of Service. This includes, but is not limited to, the forum and any Services we may provide under the hashpwn.net domain. If you do not agree, please discontinue use of the Services. 1. Eligibility You must be at least 18 years old to register for or use any hashpwn.net Services. By using our Services, you represent that you meet this requirement. 2. User Conduct When using any hashpwn.net Service, you agree not to: Post, share, or request personally identifiable information (PII). Share, request, or distribute illegally obtained data (e.g., combo lists, stolen data, etc). Engage in hate speech, harassment, or unlawful activities. Attempt to compromise, disrupt, or misuse any Service we provide. Post, share, request, or link to any sexually explicit, pornographic, or sexually suggestive content. Our Services are intended for ethical cybersecurity research, discussion, and learning. Illegal activity is strictly prohibited. 3. User Content You retain ownership of any content you post, upload, or submit to hashpwn.net Services. By submitting content, you grant hashpwn.net a non-exclusive, worldwide license to store, display, and distribute your content as necessary to operate and provide the Services. Requests for deletion of publicly posted content will be honored, except in rare cases where retention is required for legal, security, moderation, or administrative reasons (e.g., evidence of abuse). Account deletion and personal data removal requests will always be honored. 4. Privacy & Data Collection We respect your privacy. We collect basic technical information such as IP address, cookies, browser type, and usage analytics. We use this information only for site functionality, security, and moderation. We may log usage data to maintain service quality. We do not sell, rent, or share your information with third parties for advertising or marketing purposes. Users may request removal of their personal data. 5. Disclaimer of Warranties All Services provided by hashpwn.net are offered “as is” and without warranties of any kind, whether express or implied. We do not guarantee uptime, availability, or error-free operation for any Service. Use of hashpwn.net Services is at your own risk. 6. Limitation of Liability To the fullest extent permitted by law, hashpwn.net, its owners, administrators, moderators, and affiliates are not liable for any damages arising from use of our Services, including but not limited to loss of data, downtime, security issues, or service interruptions. 7. Termination We reserve the right to suspend, restrict, or terminate accounts or access to any hashpwn.net Service at our discretion for violations of these Terms or other reasons deemed necessary to protect the community and infrastructure. 8. Changes to the Terms We may update these Terms at any time. Changes will be posted on this page with a new effective date. Continued use of our Services after updates are posted constitutes acceptance of the revised Terms. 9. Contact For questions, concerns, or requests, please contact: @cyclone (Admin/Owner)

trustwallet_pwn toolkit has been released which supports extracting and decrypting Chrome based Trust Wallet browser extensions for password and seed phrase recovery. https://forum.hashpwn.net/post/10795

Active Exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN CVSS 10.0 Zero-Day (CVE-2026-20127) [image: 1772739357402-553736f5-ce8e-4570-895f-541f9947337a-image.png] Overview Security researchers and government agencies have confirmed active exploitation of a critical vulnerability affecting Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN infrastructure. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-20127, allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication on affected Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Manager systems and gain administrative access. The flaw carries a CVSS score of 10.0 (critical) and enables attackers to send crafted requests to the SD-WAN controller, resulting in login access as a high-privileged internal account. Once initial access is obtained, the attacker can manipulate SD-WAN network configuration and potentially gain full control of the platform. Cisco Talos attributes the activity to a sophisticated threat cluster tracked as UAT-8616. Investigation indicates that exploitation activity has likely been occurring since at least 2023, meaning organizations may have been compromised for several years before disclosure. Exploitation Chain Observed attacks follow a multi-stage compromise process: Initial Access Exploitation of CVE-2026-20127 allows authentication bypass on Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN controllers. Attackers gain administrative access as a privileged non-root user. Privilege Escalation Attackers downgrade the SD-WAN software to reintroduce CVE-2022-20775, a CLI path traversal vulnerability. This allows escalation from administrative access to root privileges. Persistence and Covering Tracks After obtaining root access, attackers restore the system to the original software version to conceal the downgrade. The actor establishes persistence through: Unauthorized SSH keys Creation and deletion of local user accounts Modification of startup scripts Rogue SD-WAN control connections Logs and command histories are frequently cleared or truncated to reduce forensic evidence. Observed Post-Compromise Activity Investigations identified several behaviors associated with successful compromise: Addition of rogue SD-WAN control peers to the network fabric. Creation of malicious or impersonated local user accounts. Deployment of unauthorized SSH keys in: /home/root/.ssh/authorized_keys /home/vmanage-admin/.ssh/authorized_keys Enabling root SSH login by modifying SSH configuration. Clearing or truncating logs including: syslog wtmp lastlog cli-history bash_history Unexplained software version downgrades followed by re-upgrades. Unusual control-plane peering events originating from unknown IP addresses. Threat actors also leveraged NETCONF (port 830) and SSH to move laterally between SD-WAN components within the management plane. Impact Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN components operate within the network control plane and manage connectivity between distributed sites and cloud environments. Compromise of these systems can allow attackers to: Modify routing and network policies Intercept or redirect traffic Maintain persistent access to enterprise networks Use the SD-WAN fabric as a foothold for broader compromise Organizations operating internet-exposed SD-WAN management interfaces are considered at highest risk. Government and Industry Response Multiple government cybersecurity agencies issued joint advisories warning of ongoing exploitation. U.S. federal agencies were directed to immediately inventory and patch affected SD-WAN deployments due to the risk posed to critical infrastructure and government networks. The vulnerability has been added to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring rapid remediation within federal environments. Detection and Threat Hunting Guidance Defenders are advised to investigate: Unexpected SD-WAN control-plane peering events Unknown public IP addresses establishing controller connections Root logins or SSH key changes on SD-WAN nodes Missing or abnormally small log files Evidence of temporary software downgrades followed by re-upgrades Manual validation of control connection events in SD-WAN logs is considered a critical indicator of potential exploitation. Mitigation Recommended defensive actions include: Immediately applying Cisco patches for affected SD-WAN components. Reviewing controller logs for unauthorized peering connections. Restricting access to management interfaces and SD-WAN control ports. Blocking unnecessary internet exposure of SD-WAN controllers. Implementing Cisco’s SD-WAN hardening guidance and continuous log monitoring. Organizations are strongly advised to assume potential compromise if indicators described in the advisories are present. Sources: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-8616-sd-wan/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/cisco-sd-wan-zero-day-cve-2026-20127.html https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2026-20127-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-controllermanager-zero-day-authentication-bypass https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-20127 https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk

Title: guarda_pwn Author: cyclone URL: https://github.com/cyclone-github/guarda_pwn Description: Tool to recover and decrypt Guarda crypto wallets. [image: ?username=cyclone-github&repo=guarda_pwn&theme=gruvbox] [image: guarda_pwn.svg] [image: guarda_pwn.svg] [image: guarda_pwn.svg] Install guarda_pwn go install github.com/cyclone-github/guarda_pwn@main Tool to recover and decrypt Guarda Wallet backups This tool decrypts Guarda wallet backup files. Guarda backups are encrypted using CryptoJS AES-256-CBC with OpenSSL. Contact me at https://forum.hashpwn.net/user/cyclone if you need help recovering your Guarda wallet password or seed phrase Usage example ./guarda_pwn.bin -h guarda-wallet.txt -w wordlist.txt ------------------------------------ | Cyclone's Guarda Wallet Decryptor | ------------------------------------ Hash file: guarda-wallet.txt Valid Hashes: 1 CPU Threads: 16 Wordlist: wordlist.txt Working... Password: 'Cyclone!' Decrypted: {...} Supported options -w {wordlist} -h {hash file} (base64 Guarda backup) -t {cpu threads} -s {print status every nth sec} -version (version info) -help (usage instructions) Example: ./guarda_pwn.bin -h guarda-wallet.txt -w wordlist.txt ./guarda_pwn.bin -h guarda-wallet.txt -w wordlist.txt -t 16 -s 10 Guarda Wallet Backup Format Guarda wallet backups are Base64 encoded OpenSSL AES encrypted blobs. Example: U2FsdGVkX19VhMBP5C1hK9.... Key derivation used by Guarda: PBKDF2(password, "XB7sHH26Hn&FmPLxnjGccKTfPV(yk", 1 iteration, 16 bytes, SHA1) hex(key) + postfix The resulting passphrase is then used in OpenSSL EVP_BytesToKey (MD5) to derive: AES-256 key IV Compile from source This assumes Go and Git are installed. git clone https://github.com/cyclone-github/guarda_pwn.git cd guarda_pwn go mod init guarda_pwn go mod tidy go build -ldflags="-s -w" . go install -ldflags="-s -w" . Compile from source guide https://github.com/cyclone-github/scripts/blob/main/intro_to_go.txt

Escrow ID# 85581 • Algorithm: SHA1, -m 100 • Total hashes: 4 • Price per hash: $0.0498 • Escrow URL: https://hashes.com/en/escrow/item/?id=85581 • Download hashes: 85581_100.zip

Happy New Year, hashpwn! We wrapped up our first full year in 2025 and had a lot of fun along the way. Last month (Dec) was our highest traffic month to date, driven by the 12 Days of Christmas Challenge. A big thank you to everyone who has been part of the community, and to our staff who helped turn an idea into a reality. Here's to 2026! ~ @cyclone Current Stats Members: 331 Posts: 8.2k December 2025 Highlights Page Views: 2,637,674 Unique Visitors: 162,321 New Users: 22 Posts: 1,402 Data Served: 252 GB Uptime 24h: 100% 30d: 99.96% 1y: 99.90% Forum Traffic - 2025 [image: 1767319830465-8dab8623-5cdd-4410-8e6b-47f9969e248e-image.png]